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Plaintiffs Quirky, Inc. and Wink, Inc. n/k/a Wink Dissolution Corp., on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated, hereby file suit against Facebook, Inc. and allege the following: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) sells video advertising services. When Facebook sells these 
services, Facebooks sells a package of both video advertisements for its website and metrics that enable 
purchasers to monitor their video advertisements’ performance.  
2. This case concerns two of the metrics, the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and the 
“Average Percentage of Video Viewed.” Because of what it now calls a “miscalculation,” Facebook 
dramatically inflated both metrics by an estimated 60 to 80%.  Consequently, Plaintiffs and putative class 
members purchased more video advertisements and paid a higher price for video advertisements than 
they otherwise would have. Plaintiffs and putative class members accordingly seek restitution under 
California’s Unfair Competition Law.1 
JURISDICTION 
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) 
because this is a class action wherein the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs; there are more than 100 members in the proposed class; and at least one 
member of the class of Plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from a Defendant.  
4. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Facebook, Inc. because Facebook, 
Inc. is headquartered in California, and conducts business in the state of California. 
5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of 
the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in, were directed to, and/or emanated from this 
District. Venue is also proper because Facebook’s terms of service require that claims are resolved 
“exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in 
San Mateo County….”2 
                                                                 
 
1 Plaintiffs are in the process of notifying Facebook that it breached their contract, and Plaintiffs may 
include claims for breach of contract in an amended complaint. 
2 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last accessed: 
Jan. 9, 2017). 
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INTRADISRICT ASSIGNMENT 
6. Assignment is proper to the San Francisco division of this District under Local Rule 3-
2(c)-(d), as a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in San Mateo 
County. 
PARTIES 
7. Quirky, Inc. was a community-led invention platform. Quirky raised about $200 million 
from investors, had a partnership with General Electric, and sold its products through a variety of retail 
channels, such as Target, Walgreens, and the Museum of Modern Art. Wink, Inc., n/k/a Wink Dissolution 
Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Quirky, Inc. Wink developed a platform for wireless-enabled 
products that allowed consumers to control household appliances and services through their connected 
devices and the internet. Through partnerships with General Electric, Honeywell, Nest, Phillips and 
others, over 60 Wink-enabled products were available in the marketplace. Wink enabled homeowners to 
wirelessly connect their lighting, power, and security systems through a single application. Quirky and 
Wink (collectively, “Quirky,” or “Plaintiffs”) filed for bankruptcy in September 2015. During the relevant 
time period, Plaintiffs were incorporated in Delaware and their principal place of business was New York. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are citizens of both New York and Delaware. Between May 4, 2014 and September 
23, 2016, Plaintiffs purchased video advertising services from Facebook. 
8. Defendant Facebook, Inc. is incorporated in Delaware, and its principal place of business 
is 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, CA 94025. Facebook is, therefore, a citizen of both Delaware and 
California. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. Facebook is a Fortune 500 company that operates social media services, including the 
www.facebook.com and www.instagram.com websites and the WhatsApp Messenger application. 
10. Facebook.com has 1.79 billion monthly active users.3 Users do not pay Facebook to create 
a facebook.com account. Once a user opens a Facebook account, the account holder can, at no cost, create 
a profile page, post content (such as photographs, videos, and links to articles), make friends with other 
                                                                 
 
3 Facebook, Company Info, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last accessed: Jan. 9, 2017). 
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users, and view content posted by other users.   
11. Instead of charging account holders to access facebook.com, Facebook makes money by 
selling advertising services. Facebook earns most of its revenue from advertising. For example, in 2015, 
Facebook’s advertising revenue was over $17.0 billion, more than 95% of its overall revenue.4 
12. One type of advertising service Facebook sells is video advertisements, where advertisers 
can pay money to have video displayed to Facebook users. “Facebook videos (including video ad 
products) autoplay by default . . . though the audio remains off unless users actively turn it on.”5  Facebook 
allows users to scroll past autoplaying videos (including video advertisements) without ever turning on 
the sound or watching more than a few seconds of the video.   
13. As part of Facebook’s video advertising services, advertisers can choose to purchase 
advertisements with specific objectives, including maximizing “Brand awareness,” “Video views,” or 
“Conversions.” Facebook says that a “Brand awareness” campaign will “[i]ncrease awareness for your 
brand,” whereas a “Video views” campaign will “[g]et more people to view your video content,” and a 
“Conversions” campaign will “[d]rive valuable actions on your website or app.”    
14. Facebook video advertising services include marketing analytics, which enable purchasers 
to monitor and evaluate their video advertisements’ performance.  Marketing analytics refers to the 
practice of measuring and analyzing the performance of an advertising or marketing campaign using data 
from a variety of metrics. One of the main selling points of online advertising is that it offers more detailed 
and closer to real time marketing analytics than traditional media (such as television or radio), and online 
advertisement sellers such as Facebook have promoted their marketing analytics as a prime reason that 
advertisers should purchase advertisements on their platforms.6 Online advertisers do so because 
advertisers use analytics to determine where to spend advertising dollars and the effectiveness of the 
                                                                 
 
4 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 42 (Jan. 28, 2016). 
5 Eric Blattberg, Like it or not, autoplay video won (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://digiday.com/publishers/autoplay-video-beat-regular-video-sorry-guys/. 
6 See, e.g., Yahoo, Yahoo! Gemini, https://gemini.yahoo.com/advertiser/home (“Measure the impact of 
your campaigns and drive better results by accessing actionable insights . . .”). 
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dollars spent. As an article in the Harvard Business Review explains, analytics allow companies to make 
informed decisions about how to allocate their limited marketing budgets across different mediums (such 
as television, YouTube, or Facebook), to determine which advertising campaigns to “expand” and which 
to “kill,” and to “readily adjust or allocate advertising in different markets on a monthly, weekly, or daily 
basis—and, online, even from one fraction of a second to the next.”7  
15. The importance of analytics is apparent in the competitive online video advertising 
market. YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook all have online video advertising offerings and all 
emphasize the value of their analytics platforms. When Facebook was first entering the online video 
advertising space, it knew that its analytics would be the key to its success. A November 2013 private 
presentation Facebook gave to its advertising partners (“November 2013 Presentation”) provided talking 
points on how to convince potential customers to purchase Facebook video advertisements instead of 
other video advertisements, such as YouTube advertisements or television advertisements. The 
presentation acknowledged that one of the weaknesses of Facebook’s video advertising platform was the 
lack of metrics provided to video purchasers. The presentation stated, “Currently, we only report on video 
plays, which is a weakness compared to YouTube, which reports on video views, completed views, and 
average duration of view. We are working on building out our video insights to give advertisers a better 
sense for how videos are performing. New video insights target launch: Q1 2014.”8 
16. In May 2014, Facebook began providing video advertising purchasers with new analytics, 
including video views, completed views, and average duration of view, as part of Facebook’s video 
advertising services. Facebook told its users that the purpose of the new analytics was to help video 
advertising purchasers “learn what’s resonating with people and determine how to more effectively create 
and promote your videos on Facebook.”9 Facebook said its Audience Retention analytics in particular, 
                                                                 
 
7 Id. 
8 Josh Constine, Leaked Facebook Video Ad Pitch Deck Reveals Plans To Steal TV and YouTube 
Dollars, TechCrunch (Dec. 13, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/12/13/facebook-vs-tv-and-youtube. 
9 Facebook, Introducing Video Metrics (May 5, 2014), 
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Coming-Soon-Video-Metrics. 
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such as Average Duration of Video Viewed, would assist video advertising purchasers in identifying 
underperforming videos and finding “the precise moment when most people lost interest and stopped 
watching.”10 Facebook knew and acknowledged that “having access to reliable metrics is important to 
the millions of partners who use our services to grow their businesses.” 
17. “Average Duration of Video Viewed,” which is the average amount of time that users 
watched a video, is one of the most important analytics used in evaluating video advertisements’ 
performance.  Average Duration of Video Viewed is a measure of “retention,” which advertisers care 
about because the longer people watch an advertisement, the greater the advertisement’s impact on the 
viewer.11 One study of video advertising campaigns on Facebook found that increasing retention of a 
viewer from the 3-second mark to the 10-second mark in a video resulted in a 57 percent increase in ad 
recall, a 103 percent increase in brand awareness, and a 64 percent increase in “purchase intent” (the 
intent to the purchase the advertised product).12 And because advertisers place higher value upon video 
advertisements that are viewed for longer periods, they are willing to pay more for such advertisements.   
18. After Facebook announced and released its new video analytics platform in May 2014, 
Quirky and putative class members purchased video advertising services from Facebook with the 
understanding that video advertising analytics were included in the purchased advertising services.  
19.  Upon introducing the new video metrics in their analytics platform, Facebook didn’t 
disclose that its new video metrics were not audited or accredited by the Media Rating Council, the 
marketing industry’s standard-bearer for accurate measurements. 
20. As acknowledged by Facebook in its private November 2013 Presentation and public 
statements, Facebook created and disseminated the new video analytics platform and its video metrics to 
induce users to purchase Facebook’s video advertising services.  
21. Among the new video metrics provided by Facebook were “Average Duration of Video 
Viewed” and the “Average Percentage of Video Viewed.” Below is example of how these video 
                                                                 
 
10 Id. 
11 Facebook Business, The Value of Video for Brands (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/value-of-video. 
12 Id. 
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advertising metrics would appear on a user’s screen: 
 
22. Facebook told advertising purchasers that the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” was 
the “total time spent watching a video divided by the total number of people who have played the video.” 
13 Figure 1, below, depicts how Facebook defined “Average Duration of Video Viewed.” 
                                                                
 
13 Facebook, How Is the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” Calculated?, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/community/question/?id=10104227902985423 (late accessed: 
Jan. 9, 2017). 
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Figure 1: Formula for Facebook’s “Definition” of “Average Duration of Video Viewed”  
  
 
 
23. In August 2016, Facebook disclosed in a post in its “Advertising Help Center” that its 
“Average Duration of Video Viewed” and “Average Percentage of Video Viewed” metrics had been 
improperly calculated. Facebook admitted that it had erroneously “*calculated* the Average Duration of 
Video Viewed as ‘the total time spent watching a video divided by *only* the number of people who 
have viewed a video for three or more seconds’”14  The “Average % of Video Viewed” was also erroneous 
because Facebook calculated that metric by using the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” as a 
calculation input. Figure 2 below, depicts how Facebook erroneously calculated “Average Duration of 
Video Viewed.”15 
 
Figure 2: Formula for How Facebook Actually Calculated “Average Duration of Video Viewed” 
from May 2014 to September 2016 
 
 
 
24. On or about September 23, 2016, David Fischer, Facebook’s vice president of business 
and marketing partnerships, admitted that, due to Facebook’s miscalculation, Facebook had 
misrepresented its “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric. He wrote that the “average duration of 
video viewed … metric should have reflected the total time spent watching a video divided by the total 
number of people who played the video. But it didn’t – it reflected the total time spent watching a video 
divided by only the number of ‘views’ of a video (that is, when the video was watched for three or more 
                                                                
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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seconds). And so the miscalculation overstated this metric.” 16 
25. Facebook’s “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric was inflated because when 
calculating the average, Facebook included the total time spent by under-3-second viewers in watching 
the video in the numerator of the fraction, but excluded these under-3-second views from the denominator 
of the fraction. Thus, Facebook’s “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric failed to align its criteria 
for eligible viewing time (the numerator) and its criteria for an eligible view (the denominator).  
26. The impact of the numerator-denominator mismatch can be seen through the following 
illustration. 
 
Figure 3: Example - How Duration Metric Should Have Been Calculated, According to Facebook’s 
Definition, For Video Viewed By Four Users for 1, 2, 4, and 9 seconds respectively.   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example - How Duration Metric Was Actually Calculated, From May 2014 to September 
2016, For Video Viewed By Four Users for 1, 2, 4, and 9 seconds respectively.  
 
 
 
27. Figure 3 demonstrates how Facebook should have measured average duration of video 
viewed according to its definition. By using the correct method, all four viewers are included in the 
denominator, yielding an average duration of video viewed of 4 seconds in this hypothetical. Figure 4 
demonstrates what Facebook actually did by excluding the video-watches under 3 seconds from the 
denominator. In this hypothetical, 2 of the 4 video-watches are dropped from the denominator, causing 
the average duration of video viewed to incorrectly rise to 8 seconds.   
                                                                
 
16 David Fischer, Facebook Video Metrics Update, Facebook.com (Sept. 23, 2016) 
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/facebook-video-metrics-update. 
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28. By including the time spent watching the videos by users who viewed the videos for less 
than 3 seconds, while excluding those “under 3-second” users from the denominator, the Average 
Duration of Video Viewed  metric not only failed to reflect its stated definition, it also created a highly 
misleading  result that favored Facebook. 
29. Facebook informed some its advertisers that it inflated the “Average Duration of Video 
Viewed” by between 60 and 80%.17 The inflated metric thus made video advertisements appear as if they 
were performing much better on Facebook than they actually were.  
30. The 60 to 80% inflation in the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” metric reveals that 
many users watch Facebook videos advertisements for less than 3 seconds. When users scroll right past 
muted video advertisements, the users have, under Facebook’s reported metric for “Average Duration of 
Video Viewed,” technically spent time watching the video advertisement. Thus, many of the 1-2 second 
video-watches (that contributed to the numerator, but not the denominator, of Average Duration of Video 
Viewed) reflect users quickly scrolling past muted auto-playing video advertisements. 
31. Video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, viewed the “Average Duration of Video 
Viewed” and “Average % of Video Viewed” as important metrics because users are more likely to 
remember a video advertisement and be affected by it if they watch a longer portion of the advertisement.    
32. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 
to purchase video advertisements because purchasers wanted accurate video advertising metrics 
regarding “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and “Average % of Video Viewed” so that they could 
monitor their video advertisements’ performance.  
33. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 
to continue purchasing video advertisements, and to purchase additional video advertisements, because 
purchasers believed that users were watching their videos, on average, for longer than users were actually 
watching their videos.    
34. Facebook’s misrepresentations induced video advertising purchasers, including Quirky, 
                                                                 
 
17 Suzanne Vranica and Jack Marshall, Facebook Overestimated Key Video Metric for Two Years, Wall 
Street Journal (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-overestimated-key-
video-metric-for-two-years-1474586951 
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to pay more for Facebook video advertising than they otherwise would have been willing to pay. 
35. Facebook’s misrepresentations thereby distorted the market price for its video advertising 
by artificially increasing the price of Facebook video advertising, causing video advertising purchasers, 
including Quirky, to pay more than they otherwise would have paid. 
36. Facebook’s misrepresentations provided Facebook with an unfair competitive advantage 
over other online video advertising platforms, such as YouTube, LinkedIn, and Twitter. 
37. Facebook’s misrepresentations interfered with Quirky and other putative class members’ 
attempts to utilize Facebook’s video advertising analytics, and to run effective video advertising 
campaigns. 
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 
38. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations contained 
above. 
39. Pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of the 
following “Class”:  
All persons or entities who, from May 4, 2014 to September 23, 2016 (“Class Period”), 
had an account with Facebook, Inc. and who paid for placement of video advertisements 
on a Facebook-owned website.   
Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and 
Defendant’s officers, directors, legal representatives, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded 
from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their 
immediate families and judicial staff. 
40. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action as it 
satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3). Plaintiffs seek to represent an ascertainable Class, as determining inclusion in the class can be 
done through Facebook’s own records. 
41. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further 
investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded, divided into subclasses, or modified in any other 
way. 
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42. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown and can only be determined 
through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe, and on that basis allege, that the proposed Class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable as Facebook sells millions of 
advertisements annually, and a significant portion of those advertisements are video advertisements. 
43. Questions of law and fact common to the putative Class exist that predominate over 
questions affecting only individual members, including inter alia: 
a. Whether Facebook made material misrepresentations about its video advertising 
services, including misrepresenting the “Average Duration of Video Viewed” and 
“Average % of Video Viewed” metrics; 
b. Whether Facebook’s use of inaccurate, unaudited, and unverified video metrics 
was likely to deceive members of the public and thus constituted a fraudulent 
business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 17200);  
c. Whether Facebook’s failure to properly audit and verify its video metrics was 
unethical, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to video advertising purchasers 
and thus constituted an unfair business practice under California’s Unfair 
Competition Law; and 
d. Whether and in what amount Facebook acquired money by means of its 
dissemination of inflated and improperly verified video metrics. 
44. Plaintiffs are members of the putative Class. The claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in this 
action are typical of the claims of the members of the putative Class, as the claims arise from the same 
course of conduct by the Defendant and the relief sought is common. 
45. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of 
the putative Class, as their interests are coincident with, not antagonistic to, the other members of the 
Class.  
46. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection 
and class action litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel specifically has experience litigating some of the largest 
and most complex consumer class actions, including numerous consumer class actions in the Northern 
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District of California. 
47.  Certification of the Class is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)  because 
questions of law or fact common to the respective members of the Class predominate over questions of 
law or fact affecting only individual members. This predominance makes class litigation superior to any 
other method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of these claims including consistency of 
adjudications. Absent a class action it would be highly unlikely that the members of the Class would be 
able to protect their own interests because the cost of litigation through individual lawsuits might exceed 
the expected recovery. 
48. A class action is a superior method for the adjudication of the controversy in that it will 
permit a large number of claims to be resolved in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without 
the unnecessary hardship that would result from the prosecution of numerous individual actions and the 
duplication of discovery, effort, expense, and the burden of the courts that individual actions would create. 
49. The benefits of proceeding as a class action, including providing a method for obtaining 
redress for claims that would not be practical to pursue individually, outweigh any difficulties that might 
be argued with regard to the management of the class action. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(On behalf of the Class)18 
CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, et seq. 
50. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations contained 
above. 
51. Facebook violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§17200 et seq., by engaging in the fraudulent and unfair business acts and practices alleged previously, 
and as further specified below.  
52. Facebook’s dissemination of inaccurate and inflated video-advertising metrics constitutes 
                                                                 
 
18 Pursuant to Facebook’s terms of service, the laws of the State of California govern “any claim” that 
arises between Facebook and its users, “without regard to conflict of law provisions.” Facebook, 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last accessed: Jan. 9, 2017). 
Case 3:17-cv-00233-EDL   Document 1   Filed 01/17/17   Page 13 of 16
 13 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
CASE NO.  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
a fraudulent practice under the UCL, as it is likely to deceive Class members into believing that their 
video advertisements were viewed, on an average, for a longer duration than they actually were viewed.   
53. Facebook’s failure to properly audit and verify the accuracy of its video-advertising 
metrics before disseminating them to Class members is unethical, unscrupulous, and substantially 
injurious to video-advertising purchasers, and thus constitutes an unfair practice under the UCL.  
Facebook’s practice was also contrary to legislatively declared and public policies that seek to protect 
consumers from misleading statements, as reflected by laws like the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 
U.S.C. § 45), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.), and California False 
Advertising Law (Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500). The harm these practices caused to Plaintiffs and the 
Class members outweigh their utility, if any. 
54. Facebook should have known that its metrics for “Average Duration of Video Viewed” 
and “Average % of Video Viewed” were inaccurate and inflated, and had Facebook properly audited and 
verified its video-advertising metrics it would have known that those metrics were inaccurate and inflated.  
The calculation errors that Facebook allowed to persist for over two years were obvious errors that would 
have been discovered by a reasonable auditing and verification process.   
55. Facebook’s failure to employ reasonable auditing and verification procedures gave it an 
unfair competitive advantage, as it allowed Facebook to provide video-advertising services at a lower 
cost and made those advertising services appear to be more effective than they were.   
56. Plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims under the UCL because they were injured 
and lost money or property, including but not limited to money paid for Facebook video advertisements, 
as a result of Facebook’s fraudulent and unfair business practices.  Among other things, Plaintiffs would 
not have bought as much video-advertising services if Facebook had not disseminated inflated metrics 
and would have paid a lower price for the video-advertising services they did purchase.  
57. Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiffs seek equitable relief to prevent the 
continued use of Facebook’s unfair and fraudulent practices and to restore to the Class all money 
Facebook may have acquired by means of its fraudulent and unfair business practices.   
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, Quirky, on behalf of itself and the Class, seeks the following relief: 
Case 3:17-cv-00233-EDL   Document 1   Filed 01/17/17   Page 14 of 16
 14 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
CASE NO.  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 A. An order certifying this action as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, defining the Class 
as requested herein, appointing Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC and Gibbs Law Group LLP as Class 
counsel, and finding that Plaintiffs are proper representatives of the Class requested herein. 
 B.  Plaintiffs request injunctive relief.  Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is 
necessary to protect the interests of the Class, including: (i) an order prohibiting Facebook from engaging 
in the wrongful acts described herein; (ii) requiring Facebook to engage third-party auditors to conduct 
audits and evaluations of Facebook’s advertising metrics on a periodic basis and ordering them to 
promptly correct any problems or issues detected by these auditors, and (iii) requiring Facebook to 
disclose any further inaccurate advertising metrics in a timely and accurate manner. 
 C. Plaintiffs also request equitable relief, restitution, attorneys’ fees, statutory costs, and such 
other and further relief as is just and proper. Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees under California Code of Civil 
Procedure 1021.5. 
 
DATED: January 17, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 
 GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP 
 
     By: /s/ Eric H. Gibbs     
 
      Eric H. Gibbs (SBN 178658) 
      ehg@classlawgroup.com 
      Dylan Hughes (SBN 209113) 
      dsh@classlawgroup.com 
      Aaron Blumenthal (SBN 310605) 
      ab@classlawgroup.com 
      504 14th Street, Suite 1110 
     Oakland, CA 94612 
     Telephone: (510) 350-9700 
     Facsimile: (510) 350-9701 
 
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 
  
By: /s/ Geoffrey Graber     
  
Andrew N. Friedman (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
afriedman@cohenmilstein.com 
Geoffrey Graber (SBN 211547) 
      ggraber@cohenmilstein.com 
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Eric Kafka (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
     ekafka@cohenmilstein.com  
      1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor 
     Washington, DC 20005 
     Telephone: (202) 408-4600 
     Facsimile: (202) 408-4699   
  
      Michael Eisenkraft (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
      meisenkraft@cohenmilstein.com 
      COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 
      88 Pine Street, 14th Floor 
     New York, NY 10005 
     Telephone: (212) 838-7797 
     Facsimile: (212) 838-7745 
 
     Aisha Christian (pro hac vice forthcoming) 
     129 West 27th Street, 11th Floor 
     New York, NY 10001 
      Telephone: (646) 285-2029 
 
      Charles Reichmann (SBN 206699) 
      charles.reichmann@gmail.com 
      LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES REICHMANN 
      16 Yale Circle  
      Kensington, CA 94708-1015 
      Telephone: (415) 373-8849 
      
Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class 
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